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THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM WITH TIME INCONSISTENT
UTILITY FUNCTIONS
BOUALEM DJEHICHE AND PETER HELGESSON
ABSTRACT. In this paper we study a generalization of the continuous time Principal-
Agent problem allowing for time inconsistent utility functions, for instance of
mean-variance type. Using recent results on the Pontryagin maximum princi-
ple for FBSDEs we suggest a method of characterizing optimal contracts for such
models. To illustrate this we consider a fully solved explicit example in the linear
quadratic setting.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Risk management or the problem of finding an optimal balance between ex-
pected returns and risk taking is a central topic of research within finance and
economics. Applications such as portfolio optimization, optimal stopping and
liquidation problems have been of particular interest in the literature. In such
applications it is common to consider utility functions of mean-variance type.
Mean-variance utility functions constitute an important subclass of the so called
time inconsistent utility functions for which the Bellman principle of dynamic pro-
gramming does not hold. Problems involving such utilities can therefore not be
approached by the classical Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. This question has
been addressed in Andersson and Djehiche [AD11], Bjo¨rk and Murgoci [BM10],
Bjo¨rk, Murgoci and Zhou [BMZ14], Djehiche and Huang [DH15], Ekeland and
Lazrak [EL06] and Ekeland and Pirvu [EP08]. In this paper we develop a method
of studying a mean-variance setting of the celebrated Principal-Agent problem by
means of the stochastic generalization of Pontryagin’s maximum principle.
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2 BOUALEM DJEHICHE AND PETER HELGESSON
The precise structure of the Principal-Agent problem goes as follows: The prin-
cipal employs an agent to manage a certain well-defined noisy asset over a fixed
period of time. In return for his/her effort the agent receives a compensation ac-
cording to some agreement, set before the period starts. It could for instance in-
volve a lump-sum payment at the end of the period, a continuously paying cash-
flow during the period, or both. Depending on what information the principle has
at hand to form an agreement, one distinguishes between two cases; the Full Infor-
mation- and the Hidden Action-problem. The full information case differs from the
hidden action case in that the principal can observe the actions of the agent in ad-
dition to the evolution of the asset. Therefore, under full information the principal
is allowed to tailor a contract based on both outcome and effort, not only outcome
as for hidden actions. In both cases the contract is constrained by the agent via a so
called participation constraint, clarifying the minimum requirements of the agent to
engage in the project. Under hidden action the contract is further constrained by
the incentive compatibility condition, meaning that as soon as a contract is assigned
the agent will act as to maximize his/her own utility and not necessarily that of
the principal.
The pioneering paper in which the Principal-Agent problem first appears is
Holmstro¨m and Milgrom [HM87]. They study a time continuous model over a fi-
nite period in which the principle and the agent both optimize exponential utility
functions. The principal rewards the agent at the end of the period by a lump-
sum payment. As a result they find that the optimal contract is linear with respect
to output. The paper [HM87] is generalized in [SS93] by Sha¨ttler and Sung to
a mathematical framework that uses methods from dynamic programming and
martingale theory to characterize contract optimality.
The interest in continuous time models of the Principal-Agent problem has
grown substantially since the first studies appeared. In [CWZ09], [San08], [Wes06],
[Wil13] (only to mention a few) the authors analyze continuous time models in a
classical setting, i.e. having one principal and one agent. Such models are also
covered in the recent book [CZ13] by Cvitanic´ and Zhang. Other models such
as various multiplayer versions have been studied for instance in [Kan13] and
[KSS08].
Our goal is to characterize optimal contracts in the classical setting of Principal-
Agent problem under hidden action for time inconsistent utility functions. We
consider two different modeling possibilities; Hidden Action in the weak formulation
and Hidden Contract in the strong formulation. In the first model the agent has full
information of the mechanisms behind the cash-flow and the principal wishes to
minimize his/her mean-variance utility. In the latter model the agent does not
know the structure of the cash-flow and has to protect him/her-self from high
levels of risk by an additional participation constraint of variance type. To the
best of our knowledge this has not previously been addressed in the literature.
In order to carry the program through we use recent generalizations of Pontrya-
gin’s stochastic maximum principle. The idea is to consider the Principal-Agent
problem as a sequential optimization problem. We first consider the Agent’s prob-
lem of characterizing optimal choice of effort. Then we proceed to the Principal’s
problem which, by incentive compatibility, becomes a constrained optimal control
problem of a forward-backward stochastic differential equation (from now on FB-
SDE). A similar scheme was considered in [DH14] but without the non-standard
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mean-variance consideration. Optimal control with respect to mean-variance util-
ity functions have previously been studied in for instance Zhou and Li [ZL00] and
Andersson and Djehiche [AD11].
In the present literature of the Principal-Agent problem the paper closest to
ours is [Wil13], in which a similar maximum principle approach is used. The set-
ting is classical (without time inconsistent utility functions) and the author finds
a characterization for optimal choice of effort in the Agent’s problem. The full
model involving the constrained Principal’s problem, however, is not considered.
Our contribution to the existing literature should be regarded as mathematical
rather than economical. We present a general framework for solving a class of
Principal-Agent problems, without claiming or investigating possible economical
consequences. The main results of our study are presented in Theorem 4.3 and
Theorem 4.4 in which a full characterization of optimal contracts is stated for two
different models.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we introduce the mathemat-
ical machinery from stochastic optimal control theory that is necessary for our
purposes. Mean-variance maximum principles are then derived in Section 3 by
results from Section 2 in two different but related cases. Section 4 is devoted to
fit the methods from previous sections into a Principle-Agent framework. We con-
sider two different models under Hidden Action and find necessary conditions for
optimality. Finally in Section 5 we make the general scheme of Section 4 concrete
by a simple and fully solved example in the linear-quadratic (LQ)-setting.
2. PRELIMINARIES
Let T > 0 be a fixed time horizon and (Ω,F ,F,P) be a filtered probability space
satisfying the usual conditions on which a 1-dimensional Brownian motion W =
{Wt}t≥0 is defined. We let F be the natural filtration generated by W augmented
by all P-null sets NP, i.e. F = Ft ∨NP where Ft := σ({Ws} : 0 ≤ s ≤ t).
Consider the following control system of mean-field type:{
dx(t) = b(t, x(t),E[x(t)], s(t))dt + σ(t, x(t),E[x(t)])dWt, t ∈ (0, T]
x(0) = x0
with a cost functional of the form
J (s(·)) := E
[∫ T
0
f (t, x(t),E[x(t)], s(t))dt + h(x(T),E[x(T)])
]
, (2.1)
where b : [0, T]×R×R× S→ R, σ : [0, T]×R×R→ R, f : [0, T]×R×R× S→
R and h : R×R → R and S ⊂ R is a non-empty subset. The control s(·) is ad-
missible if it is an F-adapted and square-integrable process taking values in S. We
denote the set of all such admissible controls by S [0, T]. In order to avoid tech-
nicalities in regularity that are irrelevant for our purposes we state the following
assupmtion.
Assumption 1. The functions b, σ, f and h are C1 with respect to x and x˜, where x˜
denotes the explicit dependence of E[x(·)]. Moreover, b, σ, f and h and their first
order derivatives with respect to x and x˜ are bounded and continuous in x, x˜ and
s.
We are interested in the following optimal control problem:
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Problem (S). Minimize (2.1) over S [0, T].
Any s¯(·) ∈ S [0, T] satisfying
J (s¯(·)) = inf
s(·)∈S [0,T]
J (s(·))
is called an optimal control and the corresponding x¯(·) is called the optimal state
process. We will refer to (x¯(·), s¯(·)) as an optimal pair.
The following stochastic maximum principle for characterizing optimal pairs in
problem (S) was found by Buckdahn, Djehiche and Li in [BDL11].
Theorem 2.1 (The Stochastic Maximum Principle). Let the conditions in Assumption
1 hold and consider an optimal pair (x¯(·), s¯(·)) of problem (S). Then there exists a pair of
processes (p(·), q(·)) ∈ L2F (0, T;R)× (L2F (0, T;R)) satisfying the adjoint equation
dp(t) = −{bx(t, x¯(t),E[x¯(t)], s¯(t))p(t) +E[bx˜(t, x¯(t),E[x¯(t)], s¯(t))p(t)]
+σx(t, x(t),E[x¯(t)])q(t) +E[σx˜(t, x(t),E[x¯(t)])q(t)]
− fx(t, x¯(t),E[x¯(t)]), s¯(t))−E[ f x˜(t, x¯(t),E[x¯(t)]), s¯(t))]} dt
+q(t)dWt,
p(T) = −hx(x¯(T),E[x¯(T)])−E[hx˜(x¯(T),E[x¯(T)])],
(2.2)
such that
s¯(t) = arg max
s∈S
H(t, x¯(t), s, p(t), q(t)), a.e. t ∈ [0, T], P-a.s. (2.3)
where the Hamiltonian functionH is given by
H(t, x, s, p, q) := b(t, x,E[x], s) · p + σ(t, x,E[x]) · q− f (t, x,E[x], s) (2.4)
for (t, x, s, p, q) ∈ [0, T]×R× S×R×R.
Remark 2.2. It is important to remember that Theorem 2.1 merely states a set of
necessary conditions for optimality in (S). It does not claim the existence of an
optimal control. Existence theory of stochastic optimal controls (both in the strong
and the weak sense) has been a subject of study since the sixties (see e.g. [Kus65])
and, at least in the case of strong solutions, the results seem to depend a lot upon
the statement of the problem. In the weak sense an account of existence results is
to be found in [YZ99] (Theorem 5.3, p. 71).
Remark 2.3. Restricting the space U to be convex allows for a diffusion coefficient
of the form σ(t, x,E[x], s), without changing the conclusion of Theorem 2.1. In the
case of a non-convex control space the stochastic maximum principle with con-
trolled diffusion was proven in [Pen90] and requires the solution of an additional
adjoint BSDE. We choose to leave this most general maximum principle as refer-
ence in order to keep the presentation clear.
As pointed out in Remark 2.2 it is a non-trivial task to prove the existence of
an optimal pair (x¯(·), s¯(·)) in a general stochastic control model. Under the addi-
tional assumptions;
Assumption 2. The control domain S is a convex body in R. The maps b, σ and
f are locally Lipschitz in u and their derivatives in x and x˜ are continuous in x, x˜
and s,
THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM 5
the following theorem provides sufficient conditions for optimality in (S).
Theorem 2.4 (Sufficient Conditions for Optimality). Under Assupmptions 1 and 2
let (x¯(·), s¯(·), p(·), q(·)) be an admissible 4-tuple. Suppose that h is convex and further
thatH(t, ·, ·, ·, p(t), q(t)) is concave for all t ∈ [0, T] P-a.s. and
s¯(t) = arg max
s∈S
H(t, x¯(t),E[x¯(t)], s, p(t), q(t)), a.e. t ∈ [0, T], P-a.s.
Then (x¯(·), s¯(·)) is an optimal pair for problem (S).
The stochastic maximum principle has since the early days of the subject (in
pioneering papers by e.g. Bismut [Bis78] and Bensoussan [Ben82]) developed a lot
and does by now apply to a wide range of problems more general than (S) (see for
instance [Pen90], [AD11] [BDL11], [DTT14]). For our purposes we need a refined
version of Theorem 2.1, characterizing optimal controls in a FBSDE-dynamical set-
ting under state constraints. More precisely we wish to consider a stochastic con-
trol system of the form
dx(t) = b(t,Θ(t), s(t))dt + σ(t,Θ(t))dWt
dy(t) = −c(t,Θ(t), s(t))dt + z(t)dWt
x(0) = x0, y(T) = ϕ(x(T)),
(2.5)
where b, σ, c : [0, T]×R6× S→ R and ϕ : R→ R, with respect to a cost-functional
of the form
J (s(·)) := E
[∫ T
0
f (t,Θ(t), s(t))dt + h(x(T),E[x(T)]) + g(y(0))
]
, (2.6)
and a set of state constraints
E
[∫ T
0
F(t,Θ(t), s(t))dt +H(x(T),E[x(T)]) +G(y(0))
]
:=

E
[∫ T
0
f 1(t,Θ(t), s(t))dt + h1(x(T),E[x(T)]) + g1(y(0))
]
...
E
[∫ T
0
f l(t,Θ(t), s(t))dt + hl(x(T),E[x(T)]) + gl(y(0))
]
 ∈ Λ,
(2.7)
for some closed and convex set Λ ⊆ Rl . In the above expressions we have intro-
duced
Θ(t) := (x(t), y(t), z(t),E[x(t)],E[y(t)],E[z(t)]),
in order to avoid unnecessarily heavy notation. The optimal control problem is:
Problem (SC). Minimize (2.6) subject to the state constraints (2.7) over the set
S [0, T].
To get a good maximum principle for (SC) we require some further regularity con-
ditions ensuring solvability of (2.5). These conditions are listed in the following
assumptions and can be found in [LL14].
Assumption 3. The functions b, σ, c are continuously differentiable and Lipschitz
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continuous in Θ, the functions h, g, hi, gi are continuously differentiable in x and y
respectively, and they are bounded by C(1+ |x|+ |y|+ |z|+ |x˜|+ |y˜|+ |z˜|+ |s|),
C(1+ |x|) and C(1+ |y|) respectively.
Assumption 4. All derivatives in Assumption 4 are Lipschitz continuous and
bounded.
Assumption 5. For all Θ ∈ R6, s ∈ S , A(·,Θ, s) ∈ L2F (0, T;R3), where we have
A(t,Θ, s) := (c(t,Θ, s), b(t,Θ, s), σ(t,Θ)) and
L2F (0, T;R
k) :=
{
ψ : [0, T]×Ω→ Rk
∣∣∣ ψ is F-adapted and E [∫ T
0
|ψ|2dt
]
< ∞
}
,
and for each x ∈ R, ϕ(x) ∈ L2F (Ω;R). Furthermore, there exists a constant C > 0
such that
|A(t,Θ1, s)− A(t,Θ2, s)| ≤ C|Θ1 −Θ2|, P-a.s. and for a.e. t ∈ [0, T],
|ϕ(x1)− ϕ(x2)| ≤ C|x1 − x2|, P-a.s,
for all Θ1,Θ2 ∈ R6.
Assumption 6. The functions A and ϕ satisfy the following monotonicity condi-
tions: {
E〈A(t,Θ1, s)− A(t,Θ2, s),Θ1 −Θ2〉 ≤ βE|Θ1 −Θ2|2, P-a.s
〈ϕ(x1)− ϕ(x2), x1 − x2〉 ≥ µ|x1 − x2|2
for all Θ1,Θ2 ∈ R6, x1, x2 ∈ R
In the spirit of [LL14] we are now ready to formulate the state constrained sto-
chastic maximum principle for fully coupled FBSDEs of mean-field type.
Theorem 2.5 (The State Constrained Maximum Principle). Let Assumptions 3-6 hold
and assume Λ ⊆ Rl to be a closed and convex set. If (x¯(·), y¯(·), z¯(·), s¯(·)) is an optimal
4-tuple of problem (SC), then there exists a vector (λ0,λ) ∈ R1+l such that
λ0 ≥ 0, |λ0|2 + |λ|2 = 1, (2.8)
satisfying the transversality condition
〈λ, v−E
[∫ T
0
F(t, x¯(t), y¯(t), z¯(t), s¯(t))dt +H(x¯(T)) +G(y¯(0))
]
〉 ≥ 0, ∀v ∈ Λ
(2.9)
and a 3-tuple (r(·), p(·), q(·)) ∈ L2F (Ω; C([0, T];R))× L2F (Ω; C([0, T];R))× L2F (0, T;R)
of solutions to the adjoint FBSDE
dr(t) =
{
cy(t)r(t)− by(t)p(t)− σy(t)q(t) +∑li=0 λi f iy(t)
+E[cy˜(t)r(t)− by˜(t)p(t)− σy˜(t)q(t) +∑li=0 λi f iy˜(t)]
}
dt
+
{
cz(t)r(t)− bz(t)p(t)− σz(t)q(t) +∑li=0 λi f iz(t)
+E[cz˜(t)r(t)− bz˜(t)p(t)− σz˜(t)q(t) +∑li=0 λi f iz˜(t)]
}
dWt,
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dp(t) = −
{
−cx(t)r(t) + bx(t)p(t) + σx(t)q(t)−∑li=0 λi f ix(t)
+E[−cx˜(t)r(t) + bx˜(t)p(t) + σx˜(t)q(t)−∑li=0 λi f ix˜(t)]
}
dt
+q(t)dWt,
r(0) = ∑li=0 λiE[g
i(y¯(0))],
p(T) = −ϕx(x¯(T))r(T)−∑li=0 λi(hix(x¯(T),E[x¯(T)]) +E[hix˜(x¯(T),E[x¯(T)])]),
(2.10)
such that
s¯(t) = arg max
s∈S
H(t, Θ¯(t), s, r(t), p(t), q(t),λ0,λ) a.e. t ∈ [0, T], P-a.s.
where the Hamiltonian functionH is given by
H(t,Θ, s, r, p, q,λ0,λ) :=
−r · c(t,Θ, s) + p · b(t,Θ, s) + q · σ(t,Θ)−∑li=0 λi f i(t,Θ, s).
Remark 2.6. As in Remark 2.3, analogue principles also hold in Theorem 2.5.
Remark 2.7. The maximum principle in Theorem 2.5 without state constraints is an
easy extension of the same result in [LL14] and follows the proof mutatis mutandis.
Extending the result to allow for state constraints is a standard procedure and can
be found for instance in [DH14].
3. UTILITIES OF MEAN-VARIANCE TYPE
We are now going to fit the methods presented in Section 2 to a mean-variance
framework, i.e. we want to control a FBSDE of mean-field type (2.5) with respect
to either of the following two cases:
(i). Minimize
I(u) := −E
[∫ T
0
U(t,Θ(t), s(t))dt +V(x(T))
]
+
r
2
Var
(∫ T
0
Φ(t,Θ(t), s(t))dt +Ψ(x(T))
)
,
(3.1)
over S [0, T] for some risk aversion r > 0.
(ii). Minimize
J (u) := E
[∫ T
0
U(t,Θ(t), s(t))dt +V(x(T))
]
(3.2)
over S [0, T] subject to a set of state constraints (compare (2.7)), including state-
ments of the form
Var
(∫ T
0
Φ(t,Θ(t), s(t))dt +Ψ(x(T))
)
≤ R0. (3.3)
In order to carry this through we introduce the auxiliary process
η(t) :=
∫ t
0
Φ(τ,Θ(τ), s(τ))dτ +Ψ(x(t)),
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which by Itoˆ’s Lemma solves the SDE{
dη(t) =
{
Φ(t) + b(t) ·Ψ′(x(t)) + σ2(t)2 ·Ψ′′(x(t))
}
dt + σ(t) ·Ψ′(x(t))dWt,
η(0) = 0.
(3.4)
Here we adopt the simpler notational convention Φ(t) := Φ(t,Θ(t), s(t)). By con-
sidering (2.5) with (3.4) as an augmented dynamics we may rewrite (3.1) (or anal-
ogously for the state constraint (3.3) )as
I(s) := E
[
−
∫ T
0
U(t,Θ(t), s(t))dt +V(x(T)) +
r
2
(η(T)−E[η(T)])2
]
. (3.5)
An optimal control problem involving the cost functional (3.5) is within the frame-
work of Section 2, in particular Theorem 2.10.
For the Principal-Agent problem we are interested in the following:
(MV1). Minimize (3.1) subject to the state constraint
E
[∫ T
0
u(t,Θ(t), s(t))dt + v(x(T))
]
≤W0,
for some finite W0 ∈ R over S [0, T].
(MV2). Minimize (3.2) subject to the state constraints
JE(s) := E
[∫ T
0
u(t,Θ(t), s(t))dt + v(x(T))
]
≤W0,
JV(s) := Var
(∫ T
0
φ(t,Θ(t), s(t))dt + ψ(x(T))
)
≤ R0,
for some finite W0 < 0 and R0 > 0 over S [0, T].
It is now an easy task to formulate the stochastic maximum principles that char-
acterize optimality in (MV1) and (MV2) respectively. In the two Corollaries that
follow we adopt the vector notation:
B(t) :=
(
b(t)
Φ(t) + b(t) ·Ψ′(x(t)) + σ2(t)2 ·Ψ′′(x(t))
)
, Σ(t) := σ(t)
(
1
Ψ′(t)
)
,
b(t) :=
(
b(t)
φ(t) + b(t) · ψ′(x(t)) + σ2(t)2 · ψ′′(x(t))
)
, σ(t) := σ(t)
(
1
ψ′(t)
)
,
and
x(t) :=
(
x(t)
η(t)
)
.
Corollary 3.1 (The Stochastic Maximum Principle for MV1). Let Assumptions 3-
6 hold and let Ψ(·) be three times differentiable. If (x¯(·), y¯(·), z¯(·), s¯(·)) is an optimal
4-tuple of (MV1), then there exists a vector (λA,λP) ∈ R2 such that
λP ≥ 0, λ2P + λ2A = 1, (3.6)
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and a 3-tuple (R(·), P(·), Q(·)) ∈ L2F (Ω; C([0, T];R)) × (L2F (Ω; C([0, T];R)))2 ×
(L2F (0, T;R))
2 of solutions to the adjoint FBSDE
dR(t) =
{
cy(t)R(t)− BTy (t) · P(t)− ΣTy (t) ·Q(t) + λAuy(t)− λPUy(t)
+E[cy˜(t)R(t)− BTy˜ (t) · P(t)− ΣTy˜ (t) ·Q(t) + λAuy˜(t)− λPUy˜(t)]
}
dt
+
{
cz(t)R(t)− BTz (t) · P(t)− ΣTz (t) ·Q(t) + λAuz(t)− λPUz(t)
+E[cz˜(t)R(t)− BTz˜ (t) · P(t)− ΣTz˜ (t) ·Q(t) + λAuz˜(t)− λPUz˜(t)]
}
dWt,
dP(t) =
{
cx(t)R(t)− BTx (t) · P(t)− ΣTx (t) ·Q(t) + λAux(t)− λPUx(t)
+E[cx˜(t)R(t)− BTx˜ (t) · P(t)− ΣTx˜ (t) ·Q(t) + λAux˜(t)− λPUx˜(t)]
}
dt + q(t)dWt,
(3.7)
where
R(0) = 0, P(T) = −
(
ϕx(x(T))
0
)
· R(T)−
(
λAv′(x(T))− λPV′(x(T))
r(η(T)−E[η(T)])
)
such that
s¯(t) = arg max
s∈S
H(t, Θ¯(t), s, R(t), P(t), Q(t),λA,λP) a.e. t ∈ [0, T], P-a.s.
where the Hamiltonian functionH is given by
H(t,Θ, s, R, P, Q,λA,λP) :=
−c(t,Θ, s) · R + BT(t,Θ, s) · P + ΣT(t,Θ, s) ·Q− λAu(t,Θ, s) + λPU(t,Θ, s).
Corollary 3.2 (The Stochastic Maximum Principle for MV2). Let Assumptions 3-
6 hold and let ψ(·) be three times differentiable. If (x¯(·), y¯(·), z¯(·), s¯(·)) is an optimal
4-tuple of (MV2), then there exists a vector (λP,λE,λV) ∈ R3 such that
λP ≥ 0, λ2P + λ2E + λ2V = 1, (3.8)
satisfying the transversality condition(
λE
λV
)T
·
 v1 −E
[∫ T
0 u(t,Θ(t), s(t))dt + v(x(T))
]
v2 −Var
(∫ T
0 φ(t,Θ(t), s(t))dt + ψ(x(T))
)
 ≥ 0, ∀ v1 ≤W0, v2 ≤ R0
(3.9)
and a 3-tuple (R(·), P(·), Q(·)) ∈ L2F (Ω; C([0, T];R)) × (L2F (Ω; C([0, T];R)))2 ×
(L2F (0, T;R))
2 of solutions to the adjoint FBSDE
dR(t) =
{
cy(t)R(t)− bTy (t) · P(t)− σTy (t) ·Q(t) + λEuy(t) + λPUy(t)
+E[cy˜(t)R(t)− bTy˜ (t) · P(t)− σTy˜ (t) ·Q(t) + λEuy˜(t) + λPUy˜(t)]
}
dt
+
{
cz(t)R(t)− bTz (t) · P(t)− σTz (t) ·Q(t) + λEuz(t) + λPUz(t)
+E[cz˜(t)R(t)− bTz˜ (t) · P(t)− σTz˜ (t) ·Q(t) + λEuz˜(t) + λPUz˜(t)]
}
dWt,
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dP(t) =
{
cx(t)R(t)− bTx (t) · P(t)− σTx (t) ·Q(t) + λEux(t) + λPUx(t)
+E[cx˜(t)R(t)− bTx˜ (t) · P(t)− σTx˜ (t) ·Q(t) + λEux˜(t) + λPUx˜(t)]
}
dt + Q(t)dWt,
(3.10)
where
R(0) = 0, P(T) = −
(
ϕx(x(T))
0
)
· R(T)−
(
λPV′(x(T)) + λEv′(x(T))
2λV(η(T)−E[η(T)])
)
such that
s¯(t) = arg max
s∈S
H(t, Θ¯(t), s, R(t), P(t), Q(t),λE,λP) a.e. t ∈ [0, T], P-a.s.
where the Hamiltonian functionH is given by
H(t,Θ, s, R, P, Q,λA,λP) :=
−c(t,Θ, s) · R + bT(t,Θ, s) · P + σT(t,Θ, s) ·Q− λEu(t,Θ, s)− λPU(t,Θ, s).
The transversality condition (3.9) specifies which multipliers (λE,λV) satisfying
(3.8) (given λP ∈ [0, 1]) that are of interest for characterizing optimality in (MV2).
If we let
ΛMV2 := {(x, y) ∈ R2 : x ≤W0, 0 ≤ y ≤ R0},
it is clear by (3.9) that (JE(s¯),JV(s¯)) ∈ ∂ΛMV2. This narrows the set of multipliers
to five distinct cases:
(i). If JV(s¯) = 0, then λE = 0, λV =
√
1− λ2P, 0 ≤ λP ≤ 1.
(ii). If JV(s¯) = R0, then λE = 0, λV = −
√
1− λ2P, 0 ≤ λP ≤ 1.
(iii). If JE(s¯) = W0 and JV(u¯) = 0, then λE = −
√
1− λ2Pcosθ,
λV = −
√
1− λ2P sinθ , 0 ≤ λP ≤ 1, θ ∈
[−pi2 , 0] .
(iv). If JE(s¯) = W0 and JV(u¯) = R0, then λE = −
√
1− λ2Pcosθ,
λV = −
√
1− λ2P sinθ , 0 ≤ λP ≤ 1, θ ∈
[
0, pi2
]
.
(v). If JE(s¯) = W0, then λE = −
√
1− λ2P, λV = 0, 0 ≤ λP ≤ 1.
Each of the cases (i)-(v) are illustrated in Figure 1.
4. THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM
We are now ready to state the Principal-Agent problem in the framework of
Sections 2 and 3 and thereby develop a scheme for characterizing optimality. In
the present literature two types of models seem to be the most popular; The Full In-
formation case and the Hidden Action case. Our treatment will focus on the Hidden
Action regime although similar techniques would apply also to the Full Informa-
tion case.
The Principal-Agent problem under Hidden Action (or moral hazard) is in-
spired by the seminal paper of Holmstro¨m and Milgrom [HM87] and is well treated
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JE
JV
W0
R0
ΛMV2
FIGURE 1. The cases (i)-(v) specifying the multipliers (λE,λV)
that are illustrated by arrows.
for instance in [CZ13] and [Wil13]. In what follows we first consider a mean-
variance version of such a model, using the stochastic maximum principle as our
main tool. For reasons of tractability (and in line with the present literature) we
will have to consult weak solutions of SDEs. We clarify this by referring to the
model as Hidden Action in the weak formulation.
We will also consider a simpler model under Hidden Action in which the in-
formation set of the Principal is relaxed to a larger set. Such a relaxation does not
necessarily imply Full Information and we refer to this model as Hidden Contract
in the strong formulation.
4.1. Mean-VarianceHiddenAction in theweak formulation. Consider a Principal-
Agent model where output x(t) is modelled as a risky asset solving the SDE:{
dx(t) = σ(t, x(t))dWt,
x(0) = 0, (4.1)
Here T > 0 and Wt is a 1-dimensional standard Brownian motion defined on the
filtered probability space (Ω,F ,F,P). For the diffusion we assume σ > 0 and
E
[∫ t
0 σ(t, x(t))
2dt
]
< ∞. The agent’s level of effort is represented by a process
e(·), taking values in some predefined subset E ⊆ R (typically E = [0, eˆ] for some
non-negative eˆ, or E = R) and is required to belong to the set E [0, T], where
E [0, T] := {e : [0, T]×Ω→ E; e is F-adapted}
We consider the case of Hidden Actions meaning that the principal cannot observe
e(·). Output, however, is public information and observed by both the principal
and the agent. Before the period starts the principal specifies an Fx-adapted cash-
flow s(·) (typically non-negative) for all t ∈ [0, T], which compensates the agent
for costly effort in managing x(·). Just as for the effort we assume s(t) ∈ S for all
t ∈ [0, T] and some subset S ⊆ R and require s(·) ∈ S [0, T], where
S [0, T] := {s : [0, T]×Ω→ S; s is Fx-adapted}.
The principal is not constrained by any means and can commit to any such process
s(·) ∈ S [0, T].
In this model we consider cost functionals JP and JA of the principal and the
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agent respectively of the following form:
JA(e(·); s) := E
[∫ T
0
u(t, x(t), e(t), s(t))dt + v(x(t))
]
(4.2)
and
JP(s(·)) := −E
[∫ T
0
U(t, x(t), s(t))dt +V(x(T))
]
+
r
2
Var
(∫ T
0
Φ(t, x(t), s(t))dt +Ψ(x(T))
)
,
(4.3)
for some given risk aversion r > 0. The agent will accept s(·) and start working
for the principal only if the participation constraint
JA(e¯(·); s) ≤W0, (4.4)
is fulfilled by s for some, typically negative, constant W0. We assume incentive
compatibility, meaning that the agent will act as to optimize JA in response to any
given s(·). The principal’s problem is to minimize JP under the participation con-
straint and incentive compatibility.
A direct approach to the Principal-Agent problem as described above is, how-
ever, not mathematically tractable. Therefore, in line with [CZ13] and [Wil13] we
make the problem tractable by using the concept of weak solutions of SDEs. That
is, rather than having a model in which the agent controls x(·) itself we consider
the density of output, Γe(·), as the controlled dynamics where{
dΓe(t) = Γe(t) f (t, x(t), e(t))σ−1(t, x(t))dWt,
Γe(0) = 1,
(4.5)
for a given function f describing production rate and satisfying Assumption 1 in
Section 2. Note that Γe = E(Y)where Y(t) = ∫ t0 f (τ, x(τ), e(τ)) ·σ−1(τ, x(τ))dW(τ)
and E(·) denotes the stochastic exponential. The key idea behind the weak formu-
lation of the Hidden Action model, letting the agent control Γe(t) rather than x(t),
is that it allows us to consider (x)T as a fixed but random realization (actually
Fx = F as a consequence of the regularity of σ). If Γe(·) is a martingale, which
follows by assuming for instance the Novikov condition or the Benesˇ condition
(see. [KS91] p. 200), we have by Girsanov’s theorem that the probability measure
dPe defined by
dPe
dP
= Γe(T) (4.6)
makes the process We(t) defined by
dWet = dWt − f (t, x(t), e(t))σ−1(t, x(t))dt (4.7)
a Pe-Brownian motion. In particular
dx(t) = f (t, x(t), e(t))dt + σ(t, x(t))dWet (4.8)
and
JA(e(·); s) = Ee
[∫ T
0
u(t, x(t), e(t), s(t))dt + v(x(T))
]
=
= E
[∫ T
0
Γe(t)u(t, x(t), e(t), s(t))dt + Γe(T)v(x(T))
]
.
(4.9)
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We think of the Principal-Agent problem as divided into two coupled problems;
The Agent’s problem and The Principal’s problem.
The Agent’s problem (weak formulation): Given any s(·) ∈ S [0, T] (that we as-
sume fulfills the participation constraint) the Agent’s problem is to find a process
e¯(·) ∈ E [0, T] such that the cost functional
JA(e¯(·); s) = E
[∫ T
0
Γe(t)u(t, x(t), e(t), s(t))dt + Γe(T)v(x(T))
]
,
is minimized, subject to the dynamics in (4.5).
The Principal’s problem (strong formulation): Given that the Agent’s problem
has an optimal solution e¯(·) in the weak formulation the Principal’s problem is to
find a process s¯(·) ∈ S [0, T], such that the cost functional
JP(s¯(·)) := −E
[∫ T
0
U(t, x(t), s(t))dt +V(x(T))
]
+
r
2
Var
(∫ T
0
Φ(t, x(t), s(t))dt +Ψ(x(T))
)
,
is minimized and
JA(e¯(·); s¯) = E
[∫ T
0
u(t, x(t), e(t), s(t))dt + v(x(T))
]
≤W0,
subject to the dynamics{
dx(t) = σ(t, x(t))dWt, t ∈ (0, T],
x(0) = 0.
Remark 4.1. Here we have chosen to formulate the Principal’s problem in the
strong form rather than in the weak form, which seems to be most common in
the literature. However, as pointed out in [CZ13], because of adaptiveness this
approach can be problematic in certain models. This is a fact that one should be
aware of.
In this context the following definition is natural.
Definition 4.2. An optimal contract is a pair (e¯(·), s¯(·)) ∈ E [0, T]× S [0, T] obtained
by sequentially solving first the Agent’s- and then the Principal’s problem.
In game theoretic terminology an optimal contract can thus be thought of as a
Stackelberg-equilibrium in a two-player non-zero-sum game.
It is important to note that even though the principal cannot observe the agent’s
effort, he/she can still offer the agent a contract by suggesting a choice of effort
e(·) and a compensation s(·). By incentive compatibility, however, the principal
knows that the agent only will follow such a contract if the suggested effort solves
the agent’s problem. To find the optimal effort, e¯(·), the principal must have infor-
mation of the agent’s preferences, i.e. the functions u and v. The realism of such
an assumption is indeed questionable but nevertheless necessary in our formula-
tion due to the participation constraint. In order to make the intuition clear and to
avoid any confusion we adopt the convention that the principal has full informa-
tion of the agent’s preferences u and v. This gives a tractable way of thinking of
how actual contracting is realized.
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Thus, the principal is able to predict the optimal effort e¯(·) of the agent’s prob-
lem and thereby suggest an optimal contract (e¯(·), s¯(·)), if it exists.
The idea is to apply the methods from Section 2 to characterize optimal con-
tracts in the general Principal-Agent model presented above. However, since the
control variable e figures in the diffusion of (4.5) we require the following convex-
ity assumption in order to avoid a second order adjoint process in the maximum
principle:
Assumtion 7: The set E ⊂ R is convex.
The Agent’s Hamiltonian in the weak formulation is
HA(t, x, Γe, e, p, q, s) := q · Γe · f (t, x, e)σ(t, x) − Γ
e · u(t, x, e, s), (4.10)
and by Theorem 2.1 any optimal control e¯(t) solving the Agent’s problem must
maximiseHA pointwisely. The pair (p(·), q(·)) solves the Agent’s adjoint BSDE:{
dp(t) = −
{
q(t) · f (t,x(t),e¯(t))
σ(t,x(t)) − u(t, x(t), e¯(t), s(t))
}
dt + q(t)dWt,
p(T) = −vx(x(T))
(4.11)
If f and u both are differentiable in the e variable and we assume that e¯(·) ∈ int(E),
maximizingHA translates into the first order condition
q(t) = σ(t, x(t)) · ue(t, x(t), e¯(t), s(t))
fe(t, x(t), e¯(t))
, (4.12)
which is in agreement with [Wil13]. Before proceeding to the Principal’s problem
we assume solvability of e¯ in (4.12) and we write
e¯(t) = e∗(t, x¯(t), q(t), s(t)),
where e∗ : R+ ×R4 → R is a function having sufficient regularity to allow for the
existence of a unique solution to the FBSDE (4.13) below. Based on the information
given by e∗ the principal wishes to minimize the cost JP by selecting a process s(·)
respecting (4.4). The dynamics of the corresponding control problem is, in contrast
to the SDE of the agent’s problem, a FBSDE built up by the output SDE coupled to
the agent’s adjoint BSDE. More precisely:
dx(t) = σ(t, x(t))dWt,
dp(t) = −
{
q(t) · f (t,x(t),e∗(t,x(t),q(t),s(t)))
σ(t,x(t)) − u(t, x(t), e∗(t, x(t), q(t), s(t)), s(t))
}
dt
+q(t)dWt,
x¯(0) = 0, p(T) = −vx(x(T)).
(4.13)
In order to characterize cash-flow optimality in the Principal’s problem we apply
Theorem 3.1. The Hamiltonian reads
HP(t, x, q, s, R, P1, P2, Q1, Q2,λP,λA) :=
R ·
{
−q · f (t,x,e∗(t,x,q,s))
σ(t,x) + u(t, x, e
∗(t, x, q, s), s)
}
+ P2 · (Φ(t, x, s) + σ
2(t,x)
2 Ψ
′′(x))
+Q1 · σ(t, x) + Q2 · σ(t, x)Ψ′(x)− λA · u(t, x, e∗(t, x, q, s), s) + λP · U (t, x, s),
(4.14)
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and for any optimal 4-tuple (x¯(·), p¯(·), q¯(·), s¯(·))we have the existence of Lagrange
multipliers λA,λP ∈ R satisfying the conditions in Theorem (3.1). The adjoint
processes (R(·), P1(·), Q1(·), P2(·), Q2(·)) solve the FBSDE (3.7), in which case
s¯(t) = arg max
s∈S
HP(t, x¯(t), p¯(t), q¯(t), s, R(t), P1(t), Q1(t), P2(t), Q2(t),λP,λA).
Before stating the full characterization of optimal contracts in the Mean-Variance
Principal-Agent problem under Hidden Action we introduce the following tech-
nical assumption:
(PA1). All functions involved in the Agent’s problem satisfy Assumption 1 from
Section 2 and the density of output is a martingale. The functions defining the
Principal’s problem (including composition with the map e∗) satisfy Assumptions
2-6, also from Section 2, and Ψ is three times differentiable.
Theorem 4.3. Let the statements in (PA1) and Assumption 7 hold and consider the Mean-
Variance Principal-Agent problem under Hidden Actions with risk aversion r > 0 and
participation constraint defined by W0 < 0. Then, if (e¯(·), s¯(·)) is an optimal contract
there exist numbers λA,λP ∈ R such that
λP ≥ 0, λ2A + λ2P = 1,
a pair (p(·), q(·)) ∈ L2F (0, T;R)× (L2F (0, T;R)) solving the SDE in (4.11) and a quin-
tuple (R(·), P1(·), P2(·), Q1(·), Q2(·)) ∈ L2F (Ω; C([0, T];R))× L2F (Ω; C([0, T];R))×
L2F (0, T;R) solving the adjoint FBSDE (3.7) defined by (4.13) such that, sequentially,
e¯(t) = arg max
e∈E
HA(t, x¯(t), Γe(t), e, q(t), s(t)),
and
s¯(t) = arg max
s∈S
HP(t, x¯(t), q¯(t), s, R(t), P1(t), Q1(t), P2(t), Q2(t),λP,λA),
with HamiltoniansHA andHP as in (4.10) and (4.14) respectively.
4.2. Hidden Contract in the strong formulation. We are now going to study a
different type of Mean-Variance Principal-Agent problems called Hidden Contract
models (introduced in [DH14]). Comparing to the Hidden Action model in Section
4.1 the Hidden Contracts differ in two key aspects. First we relax the information
set of the Principal from Fx to the full filtration generated by the Brownian mo-
tion. Secondly we treat the process s(·) as hidden, meaning that the Agent reacts
to the provided cash-flow given as an F-adapted process, without being aware of
the underlying dependence of output. This explains the name Hidden Contract.
The fact that the underlying mathematical structure of s(·) is unknown to the
Agent in the Hidden Contract model motivates the relevance of a Mean-Variance
framework by an extended participation constraint (compared to (4.4)). By re-
quiring an upper bound for the variance of for instance the expected accumulated
wealth provided by s(·) the Agent can protect him/her-self from undesirable high
levels of risk. The setup goes as follows:
Consider a Principal-Agent model in which output x(t) is modelled as a risky
asset solving the SDE{
dx(t) = f (t, x(t), e(t))dt + σ(t, x(t))dWt, t ∈ (0, T],
x(0) = 0. (4.15)
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Here T > 0 and Wt is a 1-dimensional standard Brownian motion defined on the
filtered probability space (Ω,F ,F,P). The functions f and σ represent production
rate and volatility respectively, and we assume both of them to satisfy Assumption
1 from the Section 2. Just as for the Hidden Action case we require any admissible
effort process e(·) to be in E [0, T]. For the admissible cash-flows, however, we
enlarge S [0, T] (due to the extended flow of information to the Principal) to
S [0, T] := {s : [0, T]×Ω→ S; s is F-adapted}.
We consider the cost functionals
JA(e(·); s) := E
[∫ T
0
u(t, x(t), e(t), s(t))dt + v(x(T))
]
, (4.16)
and
JP(s(·)) := E
[∫ T
0
U (t, x(t), s(t))dt + V(x(T))
]
, (4.17)
and the participation constraint:
JA(e¯(·); s) := E
[∫ T
0
u(t, x(t), e¯(t), s(t))dt + v(x(T))
]
≤W0,
IA(e¯(·); s) := Var
(∫ T
0
φ(t, x(t), e¯(t), s(t))dt + ψ(x(T))
)
≤ R0.
(4.18)
Just as for the Hidden Action case in Section 4.1 we consider the Agent’s- and the
Principal’s problem sequentially. The precise statements are:
The Agent’s Problem. Given any s(·) ∈ S [0, T] (fulfilling the participation con-
straint) the Agent’s problem is to find a process e¯(·) ∈ E [0, T] minimizing (4.16).
The Principal’s Problem. Given that the Agent’s problem has an optimal solu-
tion e¯(·) the Principal’s problem is to find a process s¯(·) ∈ S [0, T] minimizing the
cost functional (4.17) subject to the participation constraint (4.18).
The mathematical virtue of Hidden Contracts is the possibility of working solely
in the strong formulation. For the Agent’s problem we are facing the Hamiltonian
HA(t, x, e, p, q, s) := p · f (t, x, e) + q · σ(t, x)− u(t, x, e, s). (4.19)
Therefore, by Theorem 2.1 we have for any optimal pair (x¯(·), e¯(·)) the existence
of adjoint processes (p(·), q(·)) solving the BSDE:{
dp(t) = −{ fx(t, x¯(t), e¯(t))p(t) + σx(t, x¯(t))q(t)− ux(t, x¯(t), e¯(t))} dt + q(t)dWt,
p(T) = −vx(x¯(T)),
(4.20)
and the characterization
e¯(t) = arg max
e∈E
HA(t, x¯(t), e, p(t), q(t), s(t)), (4.21)
for a.e. t ∈ [0, T] and P-a.s.
As in the Hidden Contract case we proceed into the Principal’s problem by
assuming the existence of a function e∗ such that e¯t = e∗(t, x(t), p(t), q(t), s(t))
(having sufficient regularity to allow for existence and uniqueness of a solution to
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(4.22)). The Principal is facing the problem of minimizing JP subject to (4.18) by
controlling the following FBSDE:
dx¯t = f (t, x¯(t), e∗(t, x¯(t), p(t), q(t), s(t)))dt + σ(t, x¯(t))dWt,
dp(t) = −{ fx(t, x¯(t), e∗(t, x¯(t), p(t), q(t), s(t)))p(t) + σx(t, x¯(t))q(t)
−ux(t, x¯(t), e∗(t, x¯(t), p(t), q(t), s(t)))} dt + q(t)dWt,
x¯(0) = 0, p(T) = −vx(x¯(T)).
(4.22)
We now apply Theorem 3.2 in order to characterize optimal cash-flows in the Prin-
cipal’s problem. The associated Hamiltonian is
HP(t, x, p, q, s, R, P1, P2, Q1, Q2,λE,λV ,λP) =
R · ( fx(t, x, e(t, x, p, q, s))p + σx(t, x)q− ux(t, x, e(t, x, p, q, s), s))
+P1 · f (t, x, e(t, x, p, q, s)) + P2 ·
{
φ(t, x, e(t, x, p, q, s), s)
+ f (t, x, e(t, x, p, q, s))ψ′(x) + σ
2(t,x)
2 ψ
′′(x)
}
+ Q1 · σ(t, x) + Q2 · σ(t, x)ψ′(x)
−λE · u(t, x, e(t, x, p, q, s), s)− λP · U (t, x, s).
(4.23)
For any optimal 4-tuple (x¯(·), p¯(·), q¯(·), s¯(·)) of the Principal’s problem we have
the existence of Lagrange multipliers λE,λV ,λP ∈ R satisfying either of the con-
ditions (i)-(v) in Section 2, with λP ≥ 0 and
λ2E + λ
2
V + λ
2
P = 1,
and a triple of adjoint processes (R(·), P(·), Q(·)) solving the FBSDE (3.10) so that
s¯(t) = arg max
s∈S
HP(t, x(t), p(t), q(t), s, R(t), P1(t), P2(t), Q1(t), Q2(t),λE,λP).
For the full characterization of optimality we require the following technical as-
sumption:
(PA2). All functions involved in the Agent’s problem satisfy the Assumption 1
from Section 2. The functions defining the Principal’s problem (including compo-
sition with the map e∗) satisfy the Assumptions 2-6, also from Section 2, and ψ is
three times differentiable.
Theorem 4.4. Let the statements in (PA2) hold and consider the Mean-Variance Principal-
Agent problem under Hidden Contract with participation constraints defined by the given
parameters W0 < 0 and R0 > 0. Then, if (e¯(·), s¯(·)) is an optimal contract there exist
numbers λE,λV ,λP ∈ R such that
λP ≥ 0, λ2E + λ2V + λ2P = 1,
a pair (p(·), q(·)) ∈ L2F (0, T;R)× (L2F (0, T;R)) solving the BSDE in (4.20) and a quin-
tuple (R(·), P1(·), P2(·), Q1(·), Q2(·)) ∈ L2F (Ω; C([0, T];R))× L2F (Ω; C([0, T];R))×
L2F (0, T;R) solving the adjoint FBSDE (3.10) defined by (4.22) such that, sequentially,
e¯(t) = arg max
e∈E
HA(t, x¯(t), e, p(t), q(t), s(t)),
and
s¯(t) = arg max
s∈S
HP(t, x¯(t), p¯(t), q¯(t), s, R(t), P1(t), P2(t), Q1(t), Q2(t),λE,λV ,λP).
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with HamiltoniansHA andHP as in (4.19) and (4.23) respectively.
5. A SOLVED EXAMPLE IN THE CASE OF HIDDEN CONTRACTS
We now illustrate the method of Section 4 by considering a concrete example
of Hidden Contract type. In order to find explicit solutions we choose a linear-
quadratic setup. As a result we get optimal contracts adapted to the filtration
generated by output.
Consider the following dynamics of production,{
dx(t) = (ax(t) + be(t))dt + σdWt, t ∈ (0, T],
x(0) = 0, a, b ∈ R and σ > 0,
and let the preferences of the agent and the principal be described by quadratic
utility functions:
JA(e(·); s) := E
[∫ T
0
(st − et)2
2
dt− α · x(T)
2
2
]
, (5.1)
JP(s(·)) := E
[∫ T
0
s2t
2
dt− β · x(T)
2
2
]
. (5.2)
Note that we are following the convention of Section 4 to consider cost- rather
than payoff-functionals. Thus, the Agent’s utility function should be interpreted
as a desire to maintain a level of effort close to the compensation given by the
cash-flow. We think of the parameters α > 0 and β > 0 as bonus factors of total
production at time T. For the participation constraint we require any admissible
cash-flow s(t) to satisfy the following:{ JA(e¯(·); s) ≤W0,
Var (x(T)) < R0,
(5.3)
where W0 < 0, R0 > 0 and e¯(·) denotes the optimal effort policy of the agent given
s(·).
Assume that the principal offers the agent s(·) over the period 0 ≤ t ≤ T. The
Hamiltonian function of the agent is
HA(x, e, p, q, s) := p · (ax + be) + q · σ− (s− e)
2
2
,
so
∂HA
∂e
= bp + s− e = 0 and e¯(t) = bp(t) + s(t), (5.4)
where the pair (p, q) solves the adjoint equation{
dp(t) = −ap(t)dt + q(t)dWt,
p(T) = αx(T).
Turning to the principal’s problem we want to control the FBSDE dx(t) = (ax(t) + b
2 p(t) + bs(t))dt + σdWt,
dp(t) = −ap(t)dt + q(t)dWt,
x(0) = 0, p(T) = αx(T),
(5.5)
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optimally with respect to the cost function (5.2) and the participation constraint
(5.3). The Principal’s Hamiltonian is
HP(x, p, s, R, P1, P2, Q1, Q2,λE,λP) :=
−ap · R + (ax + b2 p + bs) · P1 + (s + ax + b2 p + bs) · P2 + σ · (Q1 + Q2)
−λE · b
2 p2
2 − λP · s
2
2
(5.6)
so
∂HP
∂s
= bP1 + (1+ b)P2 − λPs and s¯(t) = bP1(t) + (1+ b)P2(t)λP ,
where the quintuple (R(t), P1(t), P2(t), Q1(t), Q2(t)) solves the adjoint FBSDE:
dR(t) = (aR(t)− b2(P1(t) + P2(t)) + λEb2 p(t))dt,
dP1(t) = −a(P1(t) + P2(t))dt + Q1(t)dWt,
dP2(t) = Q2(t)dWt,
R(0) = 0,
P1(T) = −αR(T) + (αλE + βλP)x(T), P2(T) = 2λV(E[η(T)]− η(T)).
(5.7)
In this case, however, the auxiliary process η(t) is the same as the output x(t) in
which case P2(T) = 2λV(E[x(T)]− x(T)). To solve the BSDE in (5.7) we can make
a general linear ansatz:
p(t) = A11(t)x(t) + B11(t)R(t) + A21(t)E[x(t)] + B21(t)E[R(t)],
P1(t) = A12(t)x(t) + B12(t)R(t) + A22(t)E[x(t)] + B22(t)E[R(t)],
P2(t) = A13(t)x(t) + B13(t)R(t) + A23(t)E[x(t)] + B23(t)E[R(t)].
(5.8)
Using the standard procedure with Itoˆ’s lemma it is elementary (but tedious)
to derive a set of twelve coupled Riccati equations for the coefficients in (5.8).
A numerical example is presented in Figure 2 below. We get the unique semi-
FIGURE 2. Solution curves of (5.7) with parameter values chosen
as: a = b = σ = 1, α = 0.2, β = 1,λP = 0.1, θ = pi/2, T = 0.03.
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explicit solution to the optimal contract {e¯(t), s¯(t)}, driven by the optimal dynam-
ics (x¯(t), R¯(t)). What remains is to find a feasible tripple (λE,λV ,λP) so that the
optimal contract fulfills the participation constraint in (5.3). One way of finding
such a triple is for instance by stochastic simulation of (x¯(t), R¯(t)) (e.g. a simple
Euler-Maruyama scheme) and then estimate the payoff and the variance in (5.3) by
Monte-Carlo techniques for different values of λP. In Fig. 3 we have included the
results of such a scheme corresponding to case (iv) of the transversality condition
in Corollary 3.2. Note that R¯(t) satisfies the linear ODE
FIGURE 3. Monte-Carlo simulations of JA(e¯(·); s¯), JP(s¯(·)) and
Var(x(T)) as functions of λP and θ (relating to λE and λV via case
(iv)) based on 106 sample paths at each point. Parameter values:
a = b = σ = 1, α = 0.2, β = 1, T = 0.03.
{ dR
dt + (b
2B12 + b2B13 − λEb2B11 − a)R(t) = (λEb2 A11 − b2 A12 − b2 A13)x¯(t),
R(0) = 0,
(5.9)
so
R(t) =∫ t
0 exp
{∫ s
0 b
2B12 + b2B13 − λEb2B11 − a du
} · (λEb2 A11 − b2 A12 − b2 A13)x¯ds
exp
{∫ t
0 b
2B12 + b2B13 − λEb2B11 − a ds
} ,
and is by thatFx-adapted. Therefore, in this model the optimal contract {e¯(t), s¯(t)}
is Fx-adapted and coincides with the corresponding strong solution to the Hidden
Action problem, i.e. when the information set of the Principal is generated by out-
put.
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